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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Chao v. Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc., 534 U.S. 235 (2002).
LAW: Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 clarifies that
possession by another federal agency of unexercised authority to
regulate certain working conditions is insufficient to displace
jurisdiction of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA), under an OSHA provision which excludes OSHA
jurisdiction over working conditions "with respect to which other
federal agencies . . . exercise statutory authority to prescribe or
enforce standards or regulations affecting occupational safety and
health."
FACTS: Respondent operates a fleet of barges used for oil and
gas exploration. Rig 52, the subject barge, was drilling a well over
two miles deep in the territorial waters of Louisiana, when an
explosion occurred and killed four members of the crew and injured
two others. Under a United States Coast Guard regulation the
incident was considered a marine casualty. The United States Coast
Guard conducted an investigation of the casualty and found that
natural gas had leaked from the well, spread throughout the barge,
and was likely ignited by sparks in the pump room. Pursuant to a
report from the Coast Guard, OSHA found Rig 52 in violation of
several clauses of the Occupational Safety and Health Act.
Respondent did not deny the charges but challenged OSHA's
jurisdiction. The ALJ found that OSHA did have jurisdiction.
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed. Certiorari was granted and the Court of Appeals was
reversed.
ANALYSIS: Barges such as Rig 52 represent a different
regulatory situation. Rig 52 was an uninspected vessel, thus the
Coast Guard's regulatory authority is more limited. Since the general
marine safety regulations by the Coast Guard in these situations do
not address the occupational safety and health concerns faced by
inland drilling operations on uninspected vessels, they do not
preempt OSHA's authority.
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HOLDING: General marine safety regulations issued by the
Coast Guard did not preempt OSHA's jurisdiction over working
conditions on an "uninspected" vessel conducting inland drilling
operations, where the Coast Guard regulations did not address the
occupational safety and health risks specifically posed by inland
drilling operations on uninspected vessels. The oil and gas
exploration barge which was anchored in state territorial waters was a
"workplace" for purposes of OSHA jurisdiction.
IMPACT: Administrative agencies and their jurisdictions are
strengthened.
Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001).
LAW: In Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403
U.S. 388 (1999), the Court recognized an implied private action for
damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen's
constitutional rights.
FACTS: The Correctional Services Corporation (CSC) operated
LeMarquis Community Correctional Center, which is a halfway
house located in New York City. Malesko is a former federal inmate
who had been convicted of federal securities fraud in December 1992
and had to serve an eighteen month sentence. Malesko was
diagnosed with a heart condition and needed special prescription
medication. Further, Malesko's condition limited his physical
abilities, such as climbing stairs. Due to his heart condition, Malesko
was exempted from the policy that required inmates to use the stairs
instead of the elevator. However, on March 28, 1994, Jorge Urena,
an employee of CSC told Malesko he must use the stairs, and
although Malesko explained his heart condition and exemption, the
employee was persistent. Malesko used the stairs and suffered a
heart attack, due to which he fell and injured his ear. Three years
after the incident occurred respondent attempted to file an action pro
se. Two years following this attempt he filed an amended complaint
with counsel. The District Court treated the action as a Bivens claim
and dismissed the claim in its entirety because a Bivens action may
only be maintained against an individual. The Court of Appeals for
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the Second Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Certiorari was granted.
ANALYSIS: Although the lower courts followed the Bivens line
of reasoning, the Supreme Court recognized that this case was
outside the scope of Bivens. The Court reasons that Bivens does not
extend to corporate entities. Further, alternative remedies are as
good, if not better than Bivens remedies. For instance, federal
prisoners in private facilities enjoy a parallel tort remedy that is
unavailable to prisoners housed in government facilities.
HOLDING: The Bivens decision is meant to deter individual
federal officers, and not the agency from committing constitutional
violations. There is no implied private right of action for damages
against private entities that engaged in alleged constitutional
deprivations while acting under the color of federal law.
IMPACT: This decision weakens the broad reach of
constitutional protections. The Court limits the individual from
seeking adequate protections.
Dusenberv v. United States, 534 U.S. 161 (2002).
LAW: Under the Fifth Amendment, individuals whose property
interests are at stake due to governmental actions are entitled, under
the due process clause, to notice and an opportunity to be heard. This
applies to federal prisoners as well. The notice of a forfeiture
proceeding must be "reasonably calculated to apprise a party of the
pendency of the action and the criterion is not the possibility of
conceivable injury, but the just and reasonable character of the
requirement."
FACTS: The Federal Bureau of Investigations arrested Larry
Dean Dusenbery at a trailer house in Ohio. Later the same day they
obtained and executed a search warrant, which led to the seizure of
drugs, drug paraphernalia and other items of personal property such
as cash found in his pockets, in the dining room and other locations.
Dusenbery pled guilty to a charge of possession with intent to
distribute 813 grams of cocaine. Two years pursuant to his sentence,
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the FBI began the process of administratively forfeiting certain
personal items and destroying those items that would no longer be
needed as evidence. Under statute, the FBI was required to provide
written notice of this activity and provide publishing in a local
newspaper of this activity for three consecutive weeks. Thus, the
FBI sent letters of its intentions by certified mail addressed to the
petitioner, care of the Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) in Milan,
Michigan, where he was then incarcerated. Letters were also sent to
the address of the residence where the petitioner was arrested, and to
an address in Randolph, Ohio, the town where petitioner's mother
lived. The FBI received no response to these notices within the time
allotted and in effect declared the items administratively forfeited.
Five years later, petitioner sought return of his property in District
Court. The District Court denied his motion. The Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit vacated the District Court's judgment and
remanded. Then the District Court ruled that petitioner's due process
rights were not violated and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Finally,
certiorari was granted and the decision was affirmed.
ANALYSIS: The Court held that pursuant to the Mullane test the
use of the mail addressed to the petitioner at the penitentiary was
acceptable. "Short of allowing the prisoner to go the post office
himself, the remaining portion of the delivery would necessarily
depend on a system in effect within the prison itself relying on prison
staff."
HOLDING: The FBI's notice of the cash forfeiture was
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
petitioner of the pendency of the action."
IMPACT: The Mullane test allows the FBI flexibility in
establishing notice.
Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. South Carolina Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743
(2002).
LAW: State sovereign immunity bars Federal Maritime
Commission (FMC) from adjudicating complaints filed by private
parties against a non-consenting State.
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FACTS: South Carolina Maritime Services, Inc. (SCMS) sought
permission from South Carolina State Ports Authority (SCPA,
Respondent), to berth a cruise ship at their port on several occasions.
SCMS intended to offer trips where passengers would be permitted to
participate in gambling. Mainly due to the possibility of gambling
trips SCMS was denied permission to berth cruise ships at the SCPA
port. In effect, SCMS filed a complaint with the Federal Maritime
Commission (FMC, Petitioner), claiming that SCPA violated the
Shipping Act of 1984. Further, SCMS claimed that SCPA was
enforcing their antigambling policy in a discriminatory fashion
because SCPA had granted berthing permission to two other Carnival
cruise ships which practiced gambling on board. SCMS's complaint
was originally referred to an administrative law judge who dismissed
the complaint. However, the FMC on its own motion reviewed the
AL's ruling and subsequently overruled the decision. Next, the
SCPA filed a petition for review and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. Finally, the FMC's petition
for certiorari was granted and the decision was affirmed.
ANALYSIS: The Court reasoned that the FMC is created under
Article I powers. Thus as an agency, it cannot disregard the eleventh
amendment or its related doctrine of State Immunity from private
suits. The SCPA is an arm of the State of South Carolina, thus
sovereign immunity precludes the FMC from adjudicating SCMS'
complaint.
HOLDING: State sovereign immunity precludes Federal
Maritime Commission from adjudicating a private party's complaint
against a non-consenting State.
IMPACT: This Court's use of formal analogy and rigid
framework in decision-making reinstates the importance of the letter
of the law. The Executive and Legislative branches of the
government lose structural flexibility to change the law with the
times.
Legal SummariesFall 2002
508 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges
Hoffman Plastic Compounds. Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
LAW: Immigration Reform Act of 1986 (IRCA) foreclosed the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) from awarding back pay to
an undocumented alien who has never been legally authorized to
work in the United States, even though the alien had been unlawfully
terminated in violation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
FACTS: Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., hired Jose Castro to
operate various blending machines. Castro was hired on the basis of
documents appearing to verify his authorization to work in the United
States. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. later laid off Castro and
other employees after they collectively supported a union organizing
campaign at petitioner's plant. Three years later, in January 1992,
the NLRB found that the layoffs violated the NLRA and ordered
back pay and other relief. In June 1993, the parties came before an
ALJ to determine the amount of back pay. At this proceeding it was
revealed, based on Castro's testimony that he was never working
legally. In effect, the ALJ found that the NLRB was precluded from
awarding Castro relief. Four years later, the NLRB reversed with
respect to back pay. Hoffman filed a petition for review of the
NLRB's order in the Court of Appeals, which was denied. Certiorari
was granted, and the order affirmed.
ANALYSIS: Based on precedent, the NLRB's authority was
limited with respect to the selection of remedies, and they could not
make an exception even if the employee was in violation of the
NLRA.
HOLDING: Based on IRCA, federal immigration policy
foreclosed the NLRB from awarding back pay to an undocumented
alien who has never been legally authorized to work in the United
States.
IMPACT: Although federal immigration policy has been
strengthened by this decision, this decision also leaves open room for
employers to take advantage of this system. It remains to be seen
how employers would be punished for their wrongdoings, given that
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the employer here was under the impression that he was dealing with
legal employees when he violated the NLRA.
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002).
LAW: Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), as amended by 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a), directs that "No action shall be brought with
respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . or any other
Federal Law, by a prisoner ... until such administrative remedies as
are available are exhausted."
FACTS: Nussle, a state prison inmate, was allegedly harassed
and badly beaten by several officers. The officers, including Porter,
the petitioner, allegedly "ordered Nussle to leave his cell, placed him
against a wall and struck him with their hands, kneed him in the
back, [and] pulled his hair." Nussle claimed the attack was
unprovoked and unjustified. Nussle alleged that he was singled out
because he was perceived to be a friend of the Governor of
Connecticut, whom the correction officers did not like due to the
Governor's stand on certain labor issues. Nussle did not seek any
administrative remedies. Rather, he bypassed the grievance
procedure asserted under the PLRA and sought relief directly from
the court. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that
section 1997e(a) governs only conditions affecting prisoners
generally, not single incidents, such as corrections officers' use of
excessive force, or actions that immediately affect only particular
prisoners. The Supreme Court rejects this position.
ANALYSIS: Section 1997e(a) should be construed narrowly.
PLRA's legislative history overwhelmingly suggests that Congress
sought to curtail suits qualified as "frivolous" because of their subject
matter. In addition, the Court reaches this decision pursuant to case
precedent set forth in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), and
others. Finally, the Court recognizes that an opportunity to address
these matters internally first, might improve prison administration
and satisfy the inmate, thereby diminishing the need for litigation.
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HOLDING: The exhaustion requirement under section 1197e(a)
applies to all prisoners seeking redress for prison circumstances or
occurrences.
IMPACT: The Supreme Court draws attention to precedent. The
presumption becomes evident, that Congress expects its statutes to be
read in conformity with the Supreme Court's precedents.
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
LAW: Under the Central Hudson test, commercial speech that
neither concerns unlawful activity nor is misleading may be regulated
if: (1) asserted governmental interest is substantial; (2) regulation
directly advances that interest; and (3) regulation is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
FACTS: Section 503A of the Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act (FDAMA) exempts compounded drugs from the
drug approval requirements as long as the providers of those drugs
abide by several restrictions, including not advertising or promoting
the compounded drugs. This law was the result of policy intending
to curb abuse of the compounded drug exemption. However, a group
of licensed pharmacies that specialize in compounding drugs, sought
to enjoin enforcement of the subsections of the Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act that deal with advertising and
solicitation. The pharmacists argued that these provisions violate the
First Amendment "free speech" clause of the Constitution.
The District Court agreed with respondents and granted their
motion for summary judgment holding that the provisions do not
meet the requisite test under Central Hudson. The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, agreeing
that the provisions regarding advertisement and promotion are
unconstitutional but finding them not to be severable from the rest of
section 503A. Petitioners challenged only the Court of Appeals
constitutional holding in their petition for certiorari, and respondents
did not file a cross petition. The Court addressed only the
constitutional question and affirmed.
ANALYSIS: The Court finds that soliciting of prescriptions for
particular compounded drugs and advertising of such drugs, as
prohibited by the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act
(FDAMA) constituted "commercial speech" for purposes of the First
Amendment. However, the Court found that the provisions failed
Central Hudson because the government had not demonstrated that
the restrictions would directly advance its interests or that
alternatives less restrictive of speech were unavailable.
HOLDING: The provisions of FDAMA that exempted
compounded drugs from the Food and Drug Administration's drug
approval requirements, if providers of such drugs refrained from
advertising, promoting, or soliciting prescriptions for particular
compounded drugs were unconstitutional restrictions of commercial
speech.
IMPACT: This decision broadens the arena of free speech, and
strengthens the possibility of a constitutionality concern.
United States Postal Serv. v. Gregory, 534 U.S. 1 (2001).
LAW: The Bowling standard provides for "de novo review of
prior disciplinary actions unless: (1) The employee was informed of
the action in writing; (2) the action is a matter of record; (3) the
employee was given the opportunity to dispute the charges to a
higher level than the authority that imposed the discipline." If these
conditions are met, Board review of prior disciplinary action is
limited to determining whether the action is clearly erroneous.
Further, the Federal Circuit's statutory review of the substance of the
Board's decision is limited to determining whether they are
unsupported by substantial evidence or are arbitrary, capricious,
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.
FACTS: Maria Gregory worked for the United States Postal
Service as a letter technician. Through the course of her employment
she received at least four warnings for violations of the Postal
Service's guidelines. For instance, Gregory ignored her supervisor's
instructions to sort the mail for her route before leaving in order to
take her daughter to the doctor and as a result received a warning for
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insubordination. Further, Gregory was cited for delaying the mail
and as a result she was suspended. Then, pursuant to a third citation
she was suspended for fourteen days. Gregory filed for a grievance
on each of these citations. Pursuant to her fourth citation Gregory's
supervisor recommended that she be removed, and it was so ordered.
Gregory served in the army, placing her in a special category of
workers known as "preference eligible" who are covered by the Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA). These employees can appeal
disciplinary actions to the Merit Systems Protection Board or seek
relief through the negotiated grievance procedure, but not both.
Gregory chose to appeal to the Board. The ALJ upheld the
termination. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit affirmed the Board's decision to uphold the ALJ's factual
findings with respect to the last incident. The court further took
judicial notice of the fact that one of the grievances was resolved in
Gregory's favor. The court held that "prior disciplinary actions that
are subject to ongoing proceedings may not be used to support a
penalty's reasonableness." It therefore vacated the Board's decision
in part and remanded for further proceedings. Certiorari was granted.
ANALYSIS: The Court reasoned that although the Board
independently reviews prior disciplinary actions pending in
grievance, it also has a policy of not relying upon disciplinary actions
that have already been overturned in grievance proceedings at the
time of Board review.
HOLDING: One of Respondent's disciplinary actions was
overturned in arbitration before the Board rendered its decision, thus
the Postal Service agrees that a remand to the Federal Circuit is
necessary to determine the effect of the reversal on Respondent's
termination. The decision was vacated and remanded.
IMPACT: The Board has broad discretion in determining how to
review prior disciplinary actions and need not adopt the Federal
Circuit's rule.
SUPREME COURT OF ALASKA
Snyder v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety, DMV, 43 P.3d 157 (Alaska
2002).
LAW: Due process requires that an appellant be allowed to testify
in a new hearing if credibility is an issue.
FACTS: Appellant Snyder appealed the decision to revoke his
driver's license after an alleged driving while intoxicated (DWI)
violation. At the first hearing, the hearing officer was not convinced
by appellant's testimony, which was that he consumed alcohol only
after the accident. Consequently, the hearing officer ruled that
appellant did not meet the burden of proof to show that his blood
alcohol was below the legal limit. On appeal, the Superior Court
remanded the case because the hearing officer had erroneously placed
the burden of proof on the appellant.
On remand, the case was assigned to a new hearing officer, but
Snyder was not given notice. The new hearing officer did not hold
another hearing, but instead looked at the record of the previous
hearing and Snyder's previous DWI record and affirmed the decision,
because she did not find Snyder's former testimony credible. Snyder
appealed again, and the Superior Court affirmed. Snyder appealed to
the state Supreme Court.
ANALYSIS: The court reasons that live testimony is especially
important when a witness' credibility is at issue. Here, the new
hearing officer never got a chance to listen to the testimony of the
appellant, yet she affirmed the decision on the issue of credibility.
The new hearing officer's decision to base her decision on the
original credibility findings was fundamentally unfair.
HOLDING: This was a due process violation and a new hearing
was ordered.
IMPACT: If a new hearing officer is assigned to review a former
hearing officer's decision, the appellant must be given a chance to
testify before the new hearing officer if credibility is an issue. As a
result, an increasing number of new hearings may be issued in order
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to comply with due process of law.
SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO
Lawley v. Dep't of Higher Educ., 36 P.3d 1239 (Colo. 2001).
LAW: A review board may substitute its own conclusions of law
for those of a reviewing Administrative Law Judge when the issue is
one of ultimate fact.
FACTS: Lawley brought a gender discrimination suit against the
University of Northern Colorado stemming from the University's
decision to abolish her position as Director of Parking Services. Her
claim was that the University's decision was discriminatory, arbitrary
and capricious. Lawley presented her claim to the Colorado State
Personnel Board (Board), which first gave it to an Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) for an evidentiary hearing. The ALJ denied relief
on both grounds and concluded that the University did not
discriminate and did not act arbitrarily, capriciously or contrary to the
law. Subsequent to this ruling, the Board adopted the ALJ's finding
of facts, but rejected the ALJ's conclusions of law, thereby reversing
the decision.
ANALYSIS: The court first examined the relationship between
the ALJ and the Board, as designated by state statute, and determined
that the authority of the ALJ is fundamentally grounded in the
authority of the Board. The court then distinguished the ALJ's
finding as one of evidentiary fact instead of ultimate fact.
Evidentiary facts generally include detailed factual or historical
findings, while ultimate conclusions of fact involve conclusions of
law that determine the rights and liabilities of the parties.
HOLDING: The finding of the Board, that the University
intentionally discriminated and acted arbitrarily and capriciously, was
an ultimate conclusion of fact. Accordingly, the Board was allowed
to substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ's.
IMPACT: As argued by the University in this case, this decision
may usurp some of the function and power of Administrative Law
Judges.
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SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS
AFM Messenger Serv., Inc. v. Dep't of Employment Servs., 763
N.E.2d 272 (Ill. 2001).
LAW: When a court examines an issue that is a mixed question
of law and fact, the standard of review is a "clearly erroneous"
standard.
FACTS: Appellant AFM Messenger Service appealed a decision
by the Department of Employment Services (DOES), which held that
delivery drivers who worked for AFM were not independent
contractors. The Illinois Supreme Court looked at which standard of
review to use in this situation, which hinged on whether the issue was
one of fact or was a mixed question of law and fact.
ANALYSIS: The appellant argued that the question before the
court was one of law and therefore was entitled to de novo review.
The court went on to hold that the issue was a mixed question of law
and fact because it involved an examination of the legal effect of a
given set of facts. The court further held that the proper standard of
review is a "clearly erroneous" standard. The court reasoned that on
mixed questions of law and fact, the court was to provide deference
to the agency's decision. In adopting this standard, the court held
that the definition to be used would be the one used in Rule 52(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
HOLDING: The standard to be used in an issue of a mixed
question of law and fact is "clearly erroneous," where the decision of
the agency will be reversed only if it is clearly erroneous.
IMPACT: This decision imparts substantial deference to an
agency when the issue presented is a mixed question of law and fact.
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SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
Schreiber v. Bastemever, 644 N.W.2d 296 (Iowa 2002).
LAW: The Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics and
Conduct is considered a component of the state judicial branch, and
not an agency.
FACTS: Appellant Schreiber appealed a decision by the Iowa
Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics and Conduct (Board) to
dismiss his complaint of professional misconduct brought against his
former lawyer. Schreiber appealed under the applicable state
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which permits judicial review
of an agency's decision if any person has been "aggrieved or
adversely affected by any final agency action."
ANALYSIS: The court determined that components of the
judicial branch are specifically excluded from the state APA,
according to the language of the statute. Then, the court went on to
analyze whether the Board was a part of the judicial system. The
court looked at the fact that one of the Iowa Supreme Court's
responsibilities was to supervise the conduct of attorneys. This court
reasoned that the Iowa Supreme Court intended to delegate the
supervising responsibility to the Board upon its creation. This is
further demonstrated by the functions of the Board, specifically its
duties to investigate complaints filed against lawyers of the state.
HOLDING: The Board is not an agency under the Iowa APA.
IMPACT: The Board in this case has several attributes that could
hypothetically qualify it as an agency. By ruling to the contrary, this
court may have taken away the opportunity for people who have been
wronged by the Board to seek remedies against it under the state
APA.
SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS
Am. Trust Adm'rs. Inc., v. Sebelius, 44 P.3d 1253 (Kan. 2002).
LAW: In situations that require filing and publication to
promulgate law from an agency, the law must be published in a
proper medium.
FACTS: American Trust Administrators (ATA) appealed a
decision from the Insurance Commissioner of the state of Kansas,
who withdrew the previous approval of ATA's stop-loss insurance
policy. ATA based their appeal on the argument that Sebelius did
not have statutory authority to withdraw the approval under the state
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Also, the ATA argued that the
Commissioner, when she withdrew her approval, relied on criteria
that was not stated in the statutory authority, but instead was only
published in a bulletin. Therefore, ATA argued, the Commissioner
failed to follow the proper procedure for promulgating a policy.
Specifically, the Commissioner failed to follow the procedure of
filing and publication required of agency actions resulting in an
effective regulation.
ANALYSIS: The court first held that the Commissioner had
statutory authority to regulate the stop-loss insurance policy of the
appellant. However, the court further looked at the method in which
the Commissioner regulated the policy, which was by a published set
of criteria. The court held that because this criterion is what was
used, it is binding law and must therefore be promulgated through
proper APA procedure. The court reasoned that although the
criterion was published in a widely distributed bulletin, it still did not
fulfill the requirements of filing and publication prescribed by statute.
HOLDING: Reversed and remanded, due to the Commissioner's
failure to follow procedure in promulgating the law.
IMPACT: This decision better defines the proper procedure that
must be followed by agencies in promulgating laws. Publishing laws
in bulletins, like in the above case, even if they are widely read, will
not fulfill the requirement of filing and publication.
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SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
Evans v. DeRidder Mun. Fire, 815 So.2d 61 (La. 2002).
LAW: Results from polygraph testd are admissible in
administrative review hearings.
FACTS: Johnny Evans, Sr. was a police officer for the DeRidder
City Police force. Based on some information given to Evans by
Prater, a police informant, another man named Pickens was arrested
on drug charges. Evans allegedly then leaked information that Prater
worked as an informant for the police department, and Prater was
murdered soon after. Pickens was arrested and convicted for the
killing of Prater, and soon after his arrest he told the police that he
received the information about Prater from Evans.
Evans was investigated for his alleged divulging of information
and was asked to take a polygraph test. Evans did not pass the
polygraph test, and as a result he was dismissed for disclosing
confidential information. Evans appealed this decision to the
DeRidder Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board (Board).
On appeal, when Pickens pleaded his Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination, the City offered his prior statements as
evidence. Evidence that Evans failed the polygraph test was also
entered. The Board affirmed the decision, and Evans appealed.
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that an administrative agency is
not held to the same standards of evidence as in civil court.
However, the evidence presented nevertheless must be competent.
As to the results of the polygraph, the court stated that civil servants,
especially police officers, are routinely subjected to polygraph tests,
and the results of those tests are used in the screening and hiring
process. Furthermore, the fact that a police officer is a civil servant
and in a position of great public trust heightens the necessity of hiring
trustworthy and able candidates. Therefore, the results were both
competent and admissible.
HOLDING: Results of polygraph tests are admissible in
administrative review hearings.
22-2
IMPACT: With this ruling, the role of polygraph tests may
become more important when dealing with civil servant
administrative hearings. Still, as the concurring opinion by Justice
Knoll suggests, expanding the role of these tests may have some
danger attached, as results from the tests are not known to be 100%
accurate.
SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA
Jasper v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 642 N.W.2d 435 (Minn. 2002).
LAW: Although an issue may be technically moot, a court can
still find the issue functionally justiciable, and therefore rule on it, if
the decision has statewide significance.
FACTS: Petitioner Jasper had his driver's license revoked due to
driving under the influence of alcohol. The police officer that
stopped Jasper determined his blood alcohol content (BAC) to be
.024, well above the legal limit of .01. The police officer determined
Jasper's BAC by using a device called the Intoxilyzer 5000 series 68-
01. The Commissioner of Public Safety did not specifically approve
this particular series, but did approve the previous series, which had
no substantial differences. Jasper appealed the decision on the
grounds that the Commissioner had not approved this device. The
court ruled that the issue was technically moot, because the
Commissioner issued a regulation specifically approving the 68-01
series after the Supreme Court of Minnesota granted review of the
case.
ANALYSIS: Although the court does not issue an advisory
decision or decide cases merely to establish precedent, it does decide
questions that are technically moot if it is an issue that is functionally
justiciable. The court defined a case to be functionally justiciable if
the record contains raw material traditionally associated with
effective judicial decision making. Here, the court cites to substantial
litigation about this device and decided that the issue is one of public
importance and statewide significance that should be decided.
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HOLDING: Due to the statewide significance of this decision,
the court is entitled to rule on it.
IMPACT: This decision broadens the role of judicial review of
agency rulemaking by allowing issues that are technically moot to
come before the court if there is significant public importance.
SUPREME COURT OF WYOMING
Griffin v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp., 47 P.3d 194 (Wyo. 2002).
LAW: Proper scientific and technical foundation to admit results
from a field sobriety test is not necessary in administrative hearings.
FACTS: Officer Hampton stopped Griffin under suspicion that he
was driving while under the influence of drugs or alcohol. After
administering a field sobriety test, the officer arrested Griffin for
driving while under the influence. After his arrest, Griffin refused to
submit to chemical testing to test for alcohol. The Department of
Transportation informed Griffin by letter that they intended to
suspend his driver's license for eighteen months due to his refusal to
submit to chemical testing. The case came before the Office of
Administrative Hearings (OAH), which upheld the suspension of
Griffin's license for eighteen months. Griffin appealed.
ANALYSIS: Administrative agencies that act in a judicial role
are not bound by the same rules of evidence that govern trials by
courts or juries. Instead, the evidence must be the type that is
commonly relied upon by "a reasonably prudent man in the conduct
of their serious affairs." In this case, the agency articulated that the
officer showed the proper training and knowledge in administering
field sobriety test, and thus the lowered burden to determine
admissibility was met. As a result, the hearing officer did not err
when he admitted and relied on this evidence.
As for the determination by the agency that the officer had
probable cause, the court stated that when an agency's action or
decision is based on a consideration of relevant factors and is
rational, the reviewing court would not rule that the action or
decision is arbitrary or capricious. Here, while considering the
knowledge and experience of the officer and the facts surrounding
the arrest of Griffin, the court ruled that it was justified for a
reasonable person to conclude that Griffin was intoxicated.
Therefore, the decision on probable cause by the agency would not
be disturbed.
HOLDING: Since agencies are not governed by the same rules of
evidence as civil and criminal courts, proper scientific and technical
foundation to admit results from a field sobriety test is not necessary
in administrative hearings. Further, since there was no evidence that
the agency's decision was arbitrary or capricious, the agency's ruling
on probable cause was not disturbed.
IMPACT: This case enforces the proposition that the rules of
evidence are less stringent in administrative hearings. The relaxation
of the rules of evidence gives more discretion to an agency. As this
ruling suggests, relaxation of the rules of evidence seems to be a
recent trend.
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
Webb v. State ex rel. Ariz. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 48 P.3d 505
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2002).
LAW: Due process requires minimum procedural safeguards,
such as informing appellant that he has the right to refuse an
interview, has the right to request a hearing and has the right to
examine adverse witnesses.
FACTS: Appellant Webb was censured by the Arizona Board of
Medical Examiners (ABME) because of a complaint of
unprofessional conduct by a former patient. The ABME sent Dr.
Webb a letter, citing the nature of the charges against him and
requesting him to appear for an informal interview. Dr. Webb was
not informed that he could refuse the interview and receive a more
formal hearing, nor was he informed that he would have the
opportunity to examine adverse witnesses. At the interview, Dr.
Webb was asked questions pertaining to the incident, but was not
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given a full opportunity to question the investigating officer. At the
end of the interview, the Board imposed a punishment of permanent
and public sanction.
ANALYSIS: The court held that the right to practice medicine is
a property right, thereby invoking due process safeguards. The court
further reasoned that a person facing such a range of consequences,
such as Dr. Webb, should be afforded, at a minimum, a chance to
confront adverse evidence and question adverse witnesses.
HOLDING: Dr. Webb was denied minimum procedural
safeguards, which due process requires.
IMPACT: When facing a decision that would result in a
deprivation of a fundamental right, such as property, investigating
agencies must adhere to due process procedural safeguards. The
agency must give a petitioner full opportunity to examine adverse
witnesses. This may increase costs for agencies, since more formal-
type hearings may have to be used in situations with due process
implications.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
Branson v. District of Columbia Department of Employment
Services, 801 A.2d 975 (D.C. 2002).
LAW: An agency has a duty to address all issues brought by a
petitioner and give adequate reasons why each issue was either
accepted or dismissed.
FACTS: Claimant Branson petitioned for review from the
Department of Employment Services' (DOES) decision to deny her
unemployment compensation. Branson voluntarily left her job as an
attorney because she had been subjected to constant secondhand
cigarette smoke. Branson applied for unemployment compensation
on two grounds: (1) medical reasons, since she was allergic to
cigarette smoke; and in the alternative (2) unsafe working conditions.
The DOES denied her claim on the basis that she did not present
evidence that she had a medical condition of being allergic to
cigarette smoke. Branson brought this appeal on the argument that
the DOES did not sufficiently consider her second argument that she
quit her job due to unsafe working conditions.
ANALYSIS: The record of the DOES's decision shows that the
examining officer thoroughly considered Branson's failure to show
good medical cause. However, there was nothing in the record that
shows that the DOES considered her unsafe working conditions
claim, although the record does show that Branson's counsel
adequately raised the issue.
HOLDING: Remanded. An agency must give full and reasoned
consideration to all material facts and issues and must disclose the
basis of its order by an articulation with reasonable clarity of its
reasons for the decisions.
IMPACT: This decision may expand the role of the adjudicative
function of an agency. It strengthens the idea that agencies must
operate like judicial bodies and give petitioners due process by
considering each and every claim that is brought before them.
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